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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the interface between the economic 
and social elements of competition law in ASEAN. 
Generally, the aim of competition law should be to protect 
the process of competition, promote market efficiencies 
and enhance consumer welfare in the countries. 
Nevertheless there is a concern arising from such 
interface. Competition law strives to ensure competition 
and economic efficiency but market structure and 
behavior which harm competition or lead to inefficiency 
may have positive impact on the society. Along these 
lines, this paper looks into the social applications of 
competition legislation of Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore 
and Malaysia. Variations between different ASEAN  
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Members are expected to influence any discussions on 
this issue but social objectives of competition law, and 
social exclusions are among others the tools used to 
further social goals in the laws of the ASEAN Members 
that have been analysed. To address the possibility 
of political and special interest capturing such social 
interpretations of competition law, this paper proposes 
a model that requires increasing reliance on economic 
analysis and the use of proportionality principle to 
minimise subjectivity. 
Keywords: competition law, competition policy, economic 
regulation, social welfare, economic justice
MENGHADKAN SEMPADAN SOSIAL DALAM 
UNDANG-UNDANG PERSAINGAN DI ASEAN: SATU 
PENDEKATAN YANG BIASA?
ABSTRAK
Kertas kerja ini memeriksa sempadan yang membahagikan 
unsur-unsur ekonomi dan social dalam undang-undang 
persaingan di ASEAN. Secara umumnya, tujuan undang-
undang persaingan adalah untuk melindungi proses 
persaingan, menggalakkan lagi kecekapan pasaran dan 
meningkatkan kebajikan pengguna di negara-negara 
tersebut. Namun begitu, terdapat kebimbangan yang 
timbul daripada sempadan tersebut. Undang-undang 
persaingan adalah suatu usaha untuk memastikan 
persaingan dan kecekapan ekonomi tetapi struktur dan 
tingkah laku pasaran yang memudaratkan persaingan 
atau membawa kepada ketidakcekapan mungkin 
mempunyai kesan yang positif kepada masyarakat. Selari 
dengannya, kertas kerja ini melihat kepada aplikasi 
sosial keatas undang-undang persaingan di Thailand, 
Indonesia, Singapura dan Malaysia. Variasi diantara 
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Negara anggota ASEAN yang berbeza dijangka akan 
mempengaruhi mana-mana perbincangan mengenai isu 
ini tetapi tidak kepada objektif-objektif social undang-
undang persaingan, dan pengecualian social ini menjadi 
antara alat yang digunakan untuk meningkatkan matlamat 
sosial dalam undang-undang negara anggota ASEAN 
yang telah dianalisis. Untuk menangani kemungkinan 
kepentingan politik dan kepentingan khusus dari 
penafsiran social keatas undang-undang persaingan 
tersebut, kertas ini mencadangkan suatu model yang 
memerlukan peningkatan pergantungan terhadap analisis 
ekonomi dan penggunaan prinsip pembahagian setara 
bagi mengurangkan subjektiviti dalam penafsiran.
Kata Kunci:  undang-undang persaingan, polisi persaingan, peraturan 
ekonomi, kebajikan sosial, keadilan ekonomi
INTRODUCTION
Competition law is one of the key elements in the establishment of 
the Association of South East Asian Nations Economic Community 
[hereinafter AEC]. As a precursor to the establishment of the AEC in 
2015, all Member States of ASEAN [hereinafter AMSs] are required to 
introduce competition law in their national legal systems. As of now, 
Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia have put in 
place competition legislation enforced by the competition regulatory 
body of each respective country. Within the general conceptual 
framework, the aim of competition law should be to protect the process 
of competition, promote market efficiencies and enhance consumer 
welfare in the countries. Nevertheless there are concerns arising from 
the interface between the economic and social elements of competition 
policy considerations and framework. Competition law strives to 
ensure competition and economic efficiency but market structure and 
behaviour which harms competition or lead to inefficiency may have 
positive impact on the society. Competition law may exclude such 
situation or activity from the scope of the law or from liability provided 
by the law. On this note, this paper seeks to examine the extent of 
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social applications of competition legislation of Thailand, Indonesia, 
Singapore and more importantly, Malaysia.
This paper begins with an evaluation of the objectives of 
competition law with the view of elucidating the social parameters of 
the law. This is followed by a discussion on the practice of the selected 
AMSs in including social considerations within the realm of competition 
regulation. The discussion centres around the culmination of social 
objectives of the competition laws of those AMSs, the recognition and 
implementation of social exclusions and exemptions in such laws, and 
the consideration of social factors in merger decisions.
Before the paper concludes, some observations will be made 
on the possibility of formulating common denominators for social 
considerations in ASEAN competition laws
OBJECTIVES OF COMPETITION LAW
Competition is a process of rivalry among firms in the market. 
Competition improves market efficiency by guaranteeing efficient 
allocation of resources in the society in which the production of 
goods and provision of services are undertaken at the minimum cost 
(static efficiency).1 Competition also brings about dynamic efficiency 
in the sense that the process of competition encourages producers to 
innovate to produce products of high quality with minimum prices, 
thus leading to technological progress. However, without a legal 
framework to protect the process of competition, the benefits arising 
from the competition could be reduced by anti-competitive conduct 
that restricts, prevents and distorts competition. 
Competition law is an important instrument to provide rules 
of the game for firms to compete in the market on a level playing 
field. Therefore, it is widely accepted that the main purpose of 
competition law relates to the economic goal, i.e. to protect the 
process of competition expressed in term of economic efficiency to 
1 F.Kronthaler, J. Stephan and F. Emmert, “Analysis of Statements 
Made in Favour of and against the Adoption of Competition Law 
in Developing and Transition Economies,” www.cpftr.org/cpftr/
deliverables/Deliverable6.pdf, No. 5(2005) (last visited July 3, 
2013).
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ensure that resources are allocated in an efficient manner.2 The 
increased efficiency and innovation contribute to overall economic 
growth and development in a particular country. Therefore, the 
economic efficiency objective of competition law is not the goal in 
itself but rather a means to achieve a higher end i.e., to foster the 
overall economic performance through the realisation of both static 
and dynamic efficiencies.
It has been raised from time to time whether competition law 
should promote non-economic objectives. In other words, should 
non-economic objectives or non-efficiency related goals be pursued 
in the name of competition law? Non-economic goals may take the 
form of social objectives or other public interest objectives. The 
notion of public interest may have wider interpretation to include 
social policy and goals. In the US, economists and lawyers of the 
Chicago school argued that competition policy should not concern 
itself with non-efficiency-related goals such as income distribution. 
Instead, this goal should be pursued through other public policies. The 
Chicago school ‘considered efficiency gains as politically neutral, but 
regarded wealth transfers as politicized’.3
However, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ design for competition 
law. What might be considered an optimal policy for one country 
might not be for another. Implementing competition policy depends 
on the local context in which it is going to develop. For example, 
in some developing countries, in which the market has long been 
monopolised and concentrated, implementing competition policy is 
not about promoting and protecting the competition process. In the 
case of Chinese competition law for example, it was argued that at 
the early stage the aim of competition policy should focus on the 
creation of a competitive market, rather than maintaining an existing 
competitive market as found in developed economies.4 Consequently, 
 
2 Hua Su, “Competition Policy in a Transition Economy: The Case 
of China,” Competition Law and Policy in a Transitional China: 
Transplantation and Localization, (PhD Thesis, University of 
London, 2008): 262, citing Bing Song, 31 Stan. J. Int’l L. (1995): 
387.
3 K.J. Cseres, “The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare Standard,” 
The Competition Law Review,  No. 3(2) (2007): 125.
4 Hua Su, supra note 4, at 262, citing Bing Song, id., at 394.
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one of the objectives of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law is to promote 
the healthy development of the socialist market economy.5
The main crux of competition law is to prevent anti-
competitive behaviour such as cartel, monopolisation and abuse of 
dominant or monopolistic position, and mergers and acquisitions 
that lessen competition. The legal provisions of competition law are 
themselves consonant with the non-economic or social objectives 
such as promoting consumer interest, equity and wealth redistribution 
and the interest of small and medium enterprise [hereinafter SME]. 
Competition law may pursue non-efficiency related goals without 
sacrificing the efficiency goals. The law prohibits anti-competitive 
behaviour such as cartel and abuse of monopolistic position, but it also 
prevents price restraints, excessive price increase, market foreclosure 
and concentration of wealth. In this situation, while pursuing economic 
efficiency, the law will also indirectly benefit consumers and lower 
income groups. Competition law does not prevent a company from 
being dominant achieved through economies of scale and scope, but 
rather prevent the dominant firm from abusing its dominant position. 
Since the law against abuse of dominant position is targeting a firm 
with relatively high market share, competition law in this case will 
indirectly promote and protect the interest of the SMEs. In this case, it 
cannot be said that the economic and non-economic objectives of the 
competition is reciprocally incompatible but rather mutually enforced.
While the social benefits may be realised naturally or 
indirectly from the protection of the process of competition and from 
the promotion of economic efficiency objective, some countries have 
explicitly incorporated certain social activities as the objectives or one 
of the objectives of their competition law along with other economic 
goals. Some competition law systems take into consideration socio-
political objectives when exempting and excluding certain anti-
competitive activities which may otherwise contravene the spirit 
of competition law. The inclusion of express social objectives in the 
competition law helps a country to gain political acceptance on pro-
market reforms. For example, the objective of the South African 
competition law is the promotion of broader social goals, such as 
increasing the spread of ownership, especially among ‘historically 
5   Article 1, Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 (China).
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disadvantaged persons’.6 The design of competition law in 
the case of South Africa is to resolve historical issues such as 
the apartheid policy, which has led to imbalance in ownership and 
control of corporate wealth within the domestic economy.7 It has been 
acknowledged that incorporating other objectives attracted greater 
support to establishing a competition policy regime in South Africa.8
Thus, each country has a different political and social 
background as well as different levels of economic development. 
Different competition law systems address different concerns. 
Many competition law systems have in place the exemption regime 
which authorises otherwise anti-competitive conduct on the pretext 
to promote social or public interest objectives. For example, the 
Malaysian competition law explicitly releases an anti-competitive 
agreement if parties to the agreement can prove that the agreement 
produces social benefits9 (this will be further discussed below). The 
limits on competition are necessary in order to accomplish more 
important social policies such as affirmative action. This is important 
to avoid political turmoils and social repercussions. Political stability 
and social harmony are important ingredients for economic growth. 
In other jurisdictions such as the EU, the social goal or public interest 
policy is taken into consideration rather implicitly than explicitly. In 
Metro v Commission,10 the European Court of Justice [hereinafter 
ECJ] considered that employment was a relevant factor under the 
first condition in Article 81(3), saying that the agreement under 
consideration was ‘a stabilizing factor with regard to the provision of 
employment, since it improves the general conditions of production, 
especially when market conditions are unfavourable’. In Conseil 
Européen de la Construction d’Appareils Domestiques (CECED),11 
the Commission took into consideration ‘collective environmental 
6  Section 2(f), Competition Act 1998 (South Africa).
7 Id., at the Preamble.
8 An OECD Peer Review, Competition Law and Policy in South Africa, 
(2003): 18.
9 Section 5, Competition Act 2010 (Malaysia).
10 Case of C-26/76, Metro SB—Grossmarkte GmbH v Commission 
[1977] ECR 1875, 1916, Para 43.
11 Commission Decision of 2000/475/EC Relating to a Proceeding 
under Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty (IV.F.1/36.718. CECED) 2000 
OJ (L 187/47), Para 55.
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benefits’. In Mẻtropole Tẻlẻvision SA v Commission,12 the Court of First 
Instance [hereinafter CFI] said ‘in the context of an overall assessment, 
the Commission is entitled to base itself on considerations connected 
with the pursuit of the public interest to grant exemption under Article 
85(3)’ (emphasis added). 
While using competition laws to promote social objectives 
(either through explicit objective (s) or through the exemption 
mechanism) may generate public support for the introduction and 
implementation of these laws, the difficulty of enforcing multiple 
objectives cannot be underestimated as taking into account multiple 
objectives when applying competition law may result in conflicts 
and inconsistent decisions.13 In addition, often it is unclear as to 
what kind of social policies that should be taken into consideration 
and the manner in which multiple objectives should be pursued i.e. 
whether they enjoy equal rank vis-à-vis economic goals or merely 
as a secondary consideration.14 These uncertainties and associated 
unpredictability will undoubtedly undermine the effectiveness of 
competition law enforcement. For example, a specific goal to promote 
SMEs in competition law may conflict with the objective of achieving 
economic efficiency and may end up protecting certain competitors 
rather than protecting the competition process. The non-efficiency goals 
can be associated with social concepts such as public interest, fairness 
and equity but these concepts may be ill-defined and also may be subject 
to different interpretations. This leads to contestations. The social 
objectives of competition law might be used to serve political interests, 
which is not conducive to maintaining a competitive environment. 
The question now is can there be any possibility of 
reconciling between the economic efficiency goals and social goals 
of competition law? 
12 Joined Cases of T-528/93, 542/93, 543/93 and 546/93, 
Métropoletélévision SA and Others v Commission [1996] ECR II-
649, Paragraph 118.
13  OECD and World Bank, “Chapter 1: Objectives of Competition Policy”, 
A Framework for the Design and Implementation of Competition 
Law and Policy, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/9/27122227.pdf, 
No. 4.
14 Constanze Semmelmann, “The Future Role of the Non-Competition 
Goals in the Interpretation of the Article 81 EC”, Global Antitrust 
Review, No. 1(2008): 28.
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The economic efficiency model is based on the assumption 
that all men are rational (selfish) beings who only maximise their utility 
and if goods are allocated between consumers so that it would not be 
possible by any reallocation to make people better off without making 
anybody worse off, the situation will be Pareto-efficient and economic 
efficiency can be achieved.15 While maximisation of gains by the 
winner will increase welfare, there are valid concerns about the welfare 
of the loser. Economic efficiency will be increased if the magnitude of 
gains exceeds the magnitude of losses;16 but the loser still makes losses. 
Non-welfare arguments will quickly point to “payment” compensating 
the losers17 and this is very much linked to the use of taxation, subsidies 
and other policies to effectuate redistribution. But the answer to the 
problem could be provided by welfare economics itself. 
The Pareto-efficiency was improved by Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency which holds that an outcome is efficient if those that are 
made better off can potentially compensate those that were made 
worse off.18 The winners should be able to compensate the losers, not 
by making payment but by making it even between their gains and the 
losses of the losers.19 A producer can offer consumers a price that is 
below what they are willing to pay (this gives rise to a phenomenon 
known as consumer surplus)20 and the producer welfare can still be 
enhanced if it could produce the highest output levels at the lowest 
costs (producer surplus)21 and the producer surplus is further used to 
produce innovative products and services. 
Nevertheless it is possible that producer surplus is 
concentrated in only one community or social group or that a 
systemic deficiency prevents the losers in the market from being 
15  Kent Greenawalt, Law and Objectivity (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 170-174.
16 Ioannis Lianos, “Some Reflections on the Question of Goals of EU 
Competition Law”, UCL Centre for Law, Economics and Society 
Working Paper Series 3/2013, No.3 (2013): 5, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/
cles/research-paper-series/research-papers/cles-3-2013  (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2013). 
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id., at 7.
20 The Efficiency created here refers to Allocative Efficiency.
21 The Efficiency created here refers to Productive Efficiency.
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compensated. Thus Amartya Sen argues that welfare should not only 
be measured in terms of utility-based Pareto-optimality so that there is 
more than economic efficiency (i.e. there should be social efficiency 
as well) for the welfare of a society to be enhanced.22 He argues 
that it is possible to make ‘cogent aggregative judgments about the 
society’ (social welfare judgments) which take into consideration the 
distribution of utilities between persons.23 This is most apparent when 
a person is affected by ‘persistent deprivation’ such as when he lives 
in poverty or works under exploitative economic arrangements.24 In 
such cases, the rules determining welfare will differ in their acceptance 
of equity and efficiency so that factors such as inequality, poverty, 
distribution-adjusted national income and environmental evaluation 
will be taken into account.25
In contextualising Sen’s criticisms to the conflicting objectives 
of competition law, economic efficiency is seen as creating situations 
which differ between different individuals and groups of individuals. 
Economic efficiency is usually linked to situations where goods or 
services are optimally produced at the minimum cost allowing the 
fruits of production to be available to consumers in the best form 
but at the lowest possible price. However these situations may also 
require workers to work more hours but with lower wages, forests to be 
cleared for agricultural and industrial activities, natural resources to be 
exhausted, inefficient factories to close down creating unemployment 
etc. Sen’s argument that there should be social efficiency may mean 
that wealth will not be the sole indicator of well-being. 
As a result we can see that in some countries public interest 
becomes the main justification for excluding the implementation of 
the economic efficiency objectives of their competition law. Public 
interest as a political concept, is defined by Laswell who associates it 
with the term ‘common interest’ which in turn refers to the inclusive 
social consequences of an activity ascertained by stated procedures of 
inquiry and the consequences are compatible with the goal of human 
dignity. Components of values which are determinant of human 
22 Sen A, On Ethics and Economics, (Oxford and New York: Basil 
Backwell, 1987), 31-41.
23 Amartya Sen, “The Possibility of Social Choice”, The American 
Economic Review, 89(3) (1999): 349.
24 Id., at 358.
25 Id., at 357.
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dignity are wealth,26 well-being,27 affection,28 skill,29 rectitude,30 
respect,31 enlightenment32 and power33 but interactions between these 
values are both complementary and competitive depending on which 
society the individual lives in.34
Public interest emerges if the ‘common interest’ is 
sufficiently great to warrant the application of the public interest 
concept through inclusive coercive and non-coercive procedures.35 
Coercive procedure is reflected in the inducement to comply 
with a particular norm through sanctions while non-coercive 
procedure refers to the inducement through choices. In contrast, the 
common interest may be a private interest.36 The important factor that 
distinguishes between the public interest and a private interest is the 
inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the criteria of the interest and the 
procedures with which results that are in harmony with the criteria can 
be best achieved.37 The more inclusive the nature of the interest (the 
effects of an activity) and the procedures that allow concrete application 
of the interest, the easier they can be considered as public interest.
At the same time, public interest must become part of the 
corpus of competition law in order for it to be effectively gauged of 
its interaction with the economic efficiency objective. The layering 
or ordering of those factors that form the common interest will be 
a challenge. It is possible that different people or communities may 
view the importance of those factors differently. More importantly, 
not all countries incorporate public interest as the main trajectory for 
26 The Value of Wealth refers to Wealth and Income.
27 The Value of Well-being refers to Mental and Physical Comfort and 
Safety.
28 The Value of Affection refers to Family and Friends; attachments to 
larger groups.
29 The Value of Skill refers to Excellence in the Arts, Crafts, Professions.
30 The Value of Rectitude refers to Worship and Sense of Responsibility.
31 The Value of Respect refers to Recognition and Social Standing.
32 The Value of Enlightenment refers to Information; Interpretation of 
Past, Future and Present.
33 The Value of Power refers to Government and Legal Relations.
34 H.B. Laswell, Public Interest: Proposing Principles of Content and 
Procedure in The Public Interest, (Friedrich, C.J. (ed.), 1962), 57.
35 Id., 64.
36 Id. 
37 Id.
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incorporating social considerations. As said, the problem with social 
goals of competition law is that they are ill-defined thus leading to 
uncertainties and unpredictability. The reliance on such goals may also 
lead to political and special interest captures.
Thus it is possible in theory to reconcile the social and economic 
objectives of competition law but it will be a difficult task to find ways 
to legally operationalise the reconcilable values and norms underlying 
those objectives. It will be difficult for governments to choose between 
populist policies that provide subsidies and social goods to citizens and 
the more economically sound policies which are based on economic 
efficiency. Fierce competition among States and the lure to reducing 
the cost of regulation38 may see the efficiency objective possibly 
trumping the non-efficiency objectives including the social objectives 
of competition law. But whether this occurs in ASEAN will require an 
analysis of how regulation of competition in ASEAN Member States 
allows the incorporation of social considerations into the respective 
competition legislation there.
COMPETITION REGULATION IN ASEAN AND  THE  
AVENUES TO INCORPORATE SOCIAL 
CONSIDERATIONS
At the time of writing this article, only 5 ASEAN Member States 
(AMSs) have competition legislation in their legal systems namely 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam. There is no 
regional legal and institutional framework governing competition 
regulation in ASEAN, meaning that there is no regional competition 
code and no regional competition regulatory body in the region. All 
the five AMSs have adopted competition legislation with different 
substantive, procedural and institutional standards.
The lack of consistency between the competition laws applied 
in the AMSs is due to the vast differences among the AMSs in terms 
of political and legal systems and levels of economic and social 
development (for the purpose of this paper, 4 AMSs have been selected 
38 For more discussions on de-regulation and privatization, see Robert 
Baldwin et. al., Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and 
Practice (Oxford University Press, 2012).
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for comparison, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore thus the Competition 
Act 2010 (Malaysia) [hereinafter CA 2010], the Competition Act 2004 
(Singapore) [hereinafter CA 2004], the Trade Competition Act 1999 
(Thailand) [hereinafter TCA 1999] and Law No. 5 of 1999 (Indonesia) 
will be analysed). Focusing on the families of legal system which the 
selected AMSs belong to, the Malaysian and Singapore differ from 
Indonesia and Thailand in the sense that the legal systems of Malaysia 
and Singapore are based on common law while those of Thailand and 
Indonesia are based on civil law or at least reflect a hybrid system. That 
is from a macro perspective. From a micro perspective, the competition 
legislation itself may be modeled after the law of different countries. 
Malaysia and Singapore’s competition law statutes (CA 2010 and CA 
2004) are modeled after EU competition law with modifications to suit 
local circumstances. Indonesian and Thailand competition laws (Law 
No. 5 of 1999 and TCA 1999) however have a hybrid character. 
Thus all the laws are expected to have different objectives, and 
substantive, procedural and institutional provisions. Different objective 
and substantive provisions may result in inconsistency in the manner 
in which the social boundaries of competition regulation are delimited. 
This will be further discussed below. 
The variance is not only due to the legal provisions and 
principles adopted in the selected AMSs. All AMSs in particular, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, have different political, 
economic and social environments making it hard for uniform rules to 
be applied through the ASEAN region. Singapore has a population of 
5 million, Malaysia has a 30 million population, and Thailand has a 
population of 65 million while Indonesia has a 270 million population. 
The levels of economic development of these countries also differ. 
Singapore’s economy is very advanced concentrating on high-tech 
industries and services with big and highly-competitive players 
predominant in its market. Malaysia and Thailand on the other hand, is 
experiencing a transition from labour intensive to high-tech industries 
with broad participation of foreign and local (but government-linked, 
for Malaysia) big players as well as SMEs. Indonesia’s economy is 
still predominantly agricultural with big participation of SMEs in the 
economy.
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Social Objectives of Competition Law in Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Thailand and Singapore
As said, the objectives of the competition legislation in Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore vary and the variations reflect the 
different political, legal, economic and social environment prevailing 
in these countries.
The objectives of Malaysian competition law are found in the 
preamble of the CA 2010 which stipulates that its main objective is 
to protect the process of rivalry among firms based on the belief that 
effective competition will result in economic efficiency and innovation. 
The CA 2010 also has a secondary objective that is to promote consumer 
interest based on the belief that the consumer may benefit indirectly 
from the protection of competition by enjoying lower price, various 
choices and product and services of good quality. Both objectives are 
tied to a wider objective that is the objective of promoting economic 
development. Here, it is important to note that while protection of the 
competition process is pivotal, it is “tied” to the objective of ensuring 
economic development. Competition and economic efficiency may not 
be a goal in and of themselves but a means to achieve a higher end 
i.e., economic development. There may be conflicts between economic 
efficiency considerations and economic development considerations 
which will require a special formula to be adopted by the Malaysian 
competition authority to determine which objectives prevail.
In Singapore, the main competition legislation i.e. the CA 2004 
does not mention specific objectives in its preamble but the Competition 
Commission of Singapore [hereinafter CCS], in its guidelines states that 
the aim of competition law is to ensure that markets are competitive by 
protecting the competitive process.39 The competitive process is further 
linked to consumer interests where the guidelines highlight the need 
to empower customers to exercise choice. More detailed explanations 
of such an aim of competition law reflects the achievement of all the 
three types of efficiency by competition law – allocative efficiency, 
productive efficiency and dynamic efficiency.
39 Competition Commission of Singapore, CCS Competition 
Philosophy,http://www.ccs.gov.sg/content/ccs/en/About-CCS/ 
W h a t - We - D o / C C S - C o m p e t i t i o n - P h i l o s o p h y . h t m l 
(last visited Nov. 23, 2013). 
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While the Malaysian and Singapore’s competition law statutes 
make direct reference to protecting the process of competition, the 
competition law statutes of Indonesia and Thailand look a bit different 
in terms of the objectives of the law. 
The objectives of Thailand competition law are not explicitly 
mentioned in the TCA 1999. However in a document submitted 
by Thailand to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, the objective of the law is to promote fair and free 
trade with competitive environment.40 Free trade and competitive 
environment can be understood as pursuing economic goals expressed 
in the term of economic efficiency whereas the word `fair competition’ 
may promote wider objectives such as social  goals and well-being 
of economic actors. The word ‘fair’ is ill-defined and subject to value 
judgment and political influences.It may be used to protect small 
and medium competitors rather than the process of competition. For 
example, the Thai Competition Commission [hereinafter TCC] has 
resorted to unfair trade practice legislation against exclusive dealings 
in the motorcycle market instead of abuse of dominant position found 
in competition law. This selective case gives power to the Commission 
to hold large foreign companies liable in exclusive dealings without 
having to prove the market dominance of the alleged business. 41
The Indonesian competition law statute (Law No 5/1999) 
pursues multiple and even conflicting goals. The preamble of the law 
states that it draws upon the consideration of the following:
1. realisation of people’s welfare
2. economic democracy (which explicitly mentions economic 
growth as one of the aims of the law)
3. the requirement of healthy competition for business conduct, 
getting rid of concentration of economic power
Apart from the preamble, Article 3 of the Law No 5/1999 provides 
that the purposes of the law are to maintain public interest and 
promote national economic efficiency, create equal business 
40 OECD, “Contribution from Thailand”, OECD Global Forum 
on Competition, 26 September 2001, CCNM/GF/COMP/WD 8 
(2001): 1.
41   Deunden Nikomborirak, “Political Economy of Competition 
Law: The Case of Thailand, The Symposium on Competition Law 
and Policy in Developing Countries”, Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business, No. 26(3) (2006): 605.
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opportunities to big corporations and SMEs, prevent monopolistic 
practices and/or unfair business competition and create efficiency in 
business activities.
The objectives of Indonesian competition law are loosely 
written to allow a variety of different interpretations. The Indonesian 
competition law pursues multiple objectives including both economic 
and non-economic goals.  Since the Indonesian economy is dominated 
by small and medium enterprises, the promotion of social objectives 
such as creating equal business opportunities and fair competition 
help to gain political acceptance and to push the law through. While 
adopting multiple objectives is important and necessary to tailor the 
law with the local needs and condition, having multiple objectives may 
result in inconsistency and uncertainty. The law may be a floodgate 
to regulatory capture. The manner in which various objectives will 
be pursued is still unclear. For example, it is still uncertain whether 
economic goals should take precedence over non-economic or socio-
political goals or in what circumstances non-economic goals are allowed 
to trump competition objectives. Any attempts to take into account 
multiple objectives ‘may cause inconsistency outcomes because such 
an approach increases analytical complexity, reduces predictability 
and legal certainty, negatively affects the assessment of objectivity and 
fairness, and thus impacts the ability of competition law to achieve its 
economic objectives.42
Several articles in the Indonesian competition law such 
as articles 4, 13, 17 and 18 suggest that the objective is to limit the 
growth of large firms while protecting the market of smaller firms.
The specification of maximum market shares for monopolies, 
monopsonies, oligopolies and oligopsonies that would trigger action 
by the Commission suggests that the objectives of the law are not, in 
fact, to ensure that all firms have equal rights to compete, but rather 
that it is to limit the growth or reduce the size of large firms, quite 
independently of whether they are engaged in anti-competitive business 
conduct. The law already presumes that certain market share will lead 
to anti-competitive effects, without the underlying economic analysis 
or proof that an anti-competitive outcome results. 
42 Hua Su, Competition Law and Policy in a Transitional China: 
Transplantation and Localization, (PhD Thesis, University of 
London, 2008), 74.
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This can be best illustrated in the case of Indomaret where 
the Indonesian Competition Commission i.e. Komite Pengawasan 
Perusahaan Usaha [hereinafter KPPU] decided to prevent a large 
supermarket from expanding into areas where small stores were 
predominant on the ground that it would upset the balance in the 
principle of economic democracy between the interests in healthy 
competition and public interest.43 The KPPU in a way had ordered 
the large supermarket to give way to small-scale retailers so that there 
would be balance in the competition between large-scale, medium-
scale and small-scale players.44 The KPPU failed to identify any anti-
competitive behaviours committed by Indomaret (i.e. protecting the 
market share of existing small traditional retailers against the expansion 
of the Indomaret chain). The KPPU appears to be more concerned with 
protecting existing competition than with protecting the public interest 
by affirming its support for the competitive process.45
At the same time, apart from the objectives of the law, it is 
important to look at two other dimensions of the law in order to sieve 
the social considerations underlying the competition laws of the four 
countries. They are the exclusions and exemptions provided by the 
laws. 
Social Exclusions and Exemptions
It is common that competition legislation excludes and exempts certain 
types of commercial activities from its application. Exclusions and 
exemptions can be different depending on the system adopted by 
the competition law statute of a particular country. In countries like 
Malaysia and Singapore, exclusion and exemption are invoked by 
43  See the decision of Indonesian Competition Commission (KPPU) in 
P.T. Indomarco Prismatama (2000), 03/KPPU-L-1/2000, 27, http://
www.kppu.go.id/docs/Putusan/putusan_indomaret.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2013).  
44 Id. Also see Eleanor Fox, “We Protect Competition, You Protect 
Competitors”, World Competition Law and Economic Review, 26(2) 
(2003): 149-166.
45 Thee KianWie, “Competition Policy in Indonesia and the New 
Anti-Monopoly and Fair Competition Law”, Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies, 38(3) (2002): 331-42.
182 IIUM LAW JOURNAL VOL. 22 NO. 2. 2014
parties in different stages of proceedings where the former revolves 
around the question whether the competition legislation applies to 
a particular activity while the latter is raised upon the belief that the 
activity is governed by the legislation and possibly caught by any of the 
prohibitions thereunder. Exemptions are normally used as both defence 
to infringement allegations and grounds for granting either individual 
and/or block exemptions by the relevant competition regulatory bodies.
Malaysia
In relation to Malaysia, the CA 2010 is only applicable to enterprises 
carrying out commercial activities. The CA 2010 excludes activity in 
the exercise of government authority, activity based on the principle of 
solidarity, and purchasing activity not for the purpose offering product 
and service to the market. The CA 2010 also excludes conduct or 
agreements which need to comply with the legislative requirements, 
collective bargaining in employment sector and enterprises entrusted 
with services of general economic interest [hereinafter SGEI]. Looking 
at the grounds for excluding the application of CA 2010, there are several 
grounds which can form the social exclusions from the applicability of 
the law to the activity/conduct/agreement concerned:
1. Activity in the exercise of government authority 
2. Activity based on the principle of solidarity
3. Conduct or agreements that need to comply with legislative 
requirements
4. Collective bargaining agreements and
5. SGEI conduct or agreements
It must be noted that grounds (1) and (3) relate more to public policy but 
the policy may incorporate socio-economic and social considerations.
Under the gist of “activity in the exercise of government 
authority” the CA 2010 protects the public authority in carrying out 
public interest activities on behalf of the state from the application of 
competition law. Normally, public interest activities are associated 
with the official or prerogative functions of the state. These activities 
are essential for the interests of citizens; for example, activities for 
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safety and environmental protection, technical standardisations or 
R&D activities.46
The CA 2010 also adopts the principle of solidarity as found 
in other developed jurisdictions such as the EU and UK. This principle 
protects entities that fulfil an exclusively social objective for example, 
entities that provide social security, pensions, health insurance or health 
care services. These services are provided as part of the prerogative of 
the State services or Services of General Interest (as opposed to the 
SGEI concept). The principle of solidarity has been described as: ‘the 
redistribution of income between those who are better off and those 
who, in view of their resources and state of health, would be deprived 
of the necessary social cover’47 or ‘designed as a matter of priority 
to assist those who are in a state of need’.48 In Christian Poucet v 
Assurances Générales de France and Caisse Mutuelle Régionale du 
Languedoc-Roussillon49, the ECJ decided that ‘sickness funds, and the 
organizations involved in the management of the public social security 
system, fulfil an exclusively social function’.
The CA 2010 acknowledges the social role played by 
collective agreement in countervailing the bargaining power of 
firms vis-a-vis individual workers and preventing the exploitation of 
labour.50 This requires fixing wages in a way that may be inconsistent 
with the spirit of competition law. The application of the competition 
law in this area would undermine the role of collective agreement in 
 
46 See Case C-364/92, SAT Fluggesell schaft v Eurocontrol [1994] ECR 
I-43, dealing with European an air traffic control organisation in charge 
of maintaining and improving air navigation safety; Case C-343/95, 
Diego Calì e FigliSrL v. SEPG, [1997] ECR I-1547, dealing with 
a private entity engaged in pollution monitoring at Genoa harbour; 
and Case C-30/87 Corinne Bodson v SA PompesFunèbres des 
RègionsLibèrèes, [1988] ECR 2479, dealing with local communes 
responsible for granting concessions for funeral services.
47 Case C-159–160/91, Poucet et Pistre v Assurances Gẻnẻrales de 
France, [1993] ECR I-637, Para 10.
48 Case 70/95, Sodemare v Regione Lombardia, [1998] ECR I-3395, 
Para 29. 
49 Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91, Poucet et Pistre v Assurances 
Gẻnẻrales de France and Caisse Mutuelle Regionale du Languedoc-
Roussillon [1993] ECR I-637, Para 18.
50 Second Schedule, Para (b), Competition Act 2010 (Malaysia), 
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improving employment and work conditions, thus undermining the 
overall public interest goal. 
The CA 2010 also excludes services of general economic 
interest (SGEI) from its application. The European Commission has 
stated that ‘services of general economic interest’ are services that 
‘public authorities consider need to be provided even where the market 
may not have sufficient incentives to do so’.51 Due to the natural 
monopolistic character of these industries, the government tends to 
grant or maintain special or exclusive rights in favour of that single 
operator or group of operators. The postal service is expected to be 
excluded from the ambit of the CA due to its SGEI nature, especially 
due to the presence of market failures, such as natural monopolies 
and the need to meet universal service obligations. Credit institutions 
may also be designed as SGEI to promote the interest of SMEs and 
other socio-economic objectives such as extending social housing 
loans to the public at large. In the case of postal service, basic non-
application of competition law is necessary to preserve ‘cross-subsidy’ 
or to prevent competitors from selecting the most profitable parts of 
the postal service system, leaving the non-profit part such as universal 
service provision to the holder of the exclusive right.
Apart from exclusions, social considerations may find ways 
into the exemption process. An enterprise may apply for individual 
exemption under Section 6 of the CA 2010 and the Malaysian 
Competition Commission [hereinafter MyCC] may grant a block 
exemption covering certain agreements under Section 8 of the CA 
2010. An anti-competitive agreement under sec 4 can be exempted 
from prohibition in Section 4 of the CA 2010 if it fulfills the criteria 
provided for in Section 5, namely that the agreement must produce 
efficiency, social and technological benefits, as well as the requirement 
of indispensability, proportionality and substantial elimination of 
competition.  The mention of social benefits as a ground for exemptions 
indicates that social considerations enjoys equal rankingvis-à-vis 
economic goals and may trump economic efficiency considerations 
provided that the social benefits are proportionate to the harm to market 
competition. 
 
51 See the EU Commission’s Communication on Service of General 
Interest in Europecase, supra note 67, Para 14.
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 However, the CA 2010 does not define what can be considered 
as social benefits that allow enterprises to enjoy the exemption relief. 
In addition, the manner in which the social objectives should be 
balanced against the effect of the agreement on competition (to see 
the proportionate effect)is still unclear, i.e. how much weight should 
be given to social considerations and to how far that the agreement is 
allowed to degrade the level of competition in the relevant market. The 
potential clash between promoting competition and the other social 
goals of competition law is best illustrated by the case of regulation 
governing legal professional services. Regulatory scheme governing 
the legal profession such as fixing of the scale of fees might be important 
to maintain sound professional standards, and to ensure the integrity of 
the profession is safeguarded in the interest of the public. However, 
the scale of fees system may result in anti-competitive practices that 
will injure consumers. The Solicitors Remuneration Order 2005 which 
fixes the fee for certain legal services may be used as a “legal sanction” 
by legal firms to collude to fix the price of a particular legal service. 
Therefore, it is highly likely that complicated trade-offs emerge between 
maintaining competition and promoting other social objectives.
Singapore
The Singapore competition law statute (CA 2004) has exclusion 
provisions as well. The following activities are excluded from the 
application of such law:
1. Service of General Economic Interest (SGEI) activities;
2. Activities necessary to comply with legal requirements or to 
avoid conflict with Singapore’s international obligations;  
3. Activities arising from exceptional or compelling reasons of 
public policy;
4. Conduct relating to the clearing and exchanging of articles 
undertaking by the Automated Clearing House or activity of 
the Singapore Clearing Houses Association in relation to its 
activities regarding Automated Clearing House;
5. Vertical agreements, i.e. arrangements between businesses 
at different levels of the production or distribution chain; 
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6. Activities regulated under Postal Services Act, Public Transport 
Council Act, Rapid Transit Systems Act, Maritime and Port 
Authority of Singapore Act;
7. Sectors have been excluded based on public interest 
considerations such as national security, defence and other 
strategic interests or because existing sectoral competition 
frameworks are already in place;
8. Agreement exempted under block exemption;
9. Any agreement entered into or any conduct on the part of 
the Government; any statutory body; or any person acting on 
behalf of the Government or that statutory body, as the case 
may be, in relation to that activity, agreement or conduct unless 
prescribed by the Minister.
Compared to the Malaysian CA 2010, the grounds contained in the 
Singapore CA 2004 for excluding the application of the competition 
legislation are more specific but there is less room for manoeuver for 
those wanting social considerations to be included in a competition 
decision. Possibly such considerations can be argued under the 
headings of SGEI, public interest considerations, public policy, 
compliance with international obligations (but will depend whether 
the social considerations have culminated in international standards), 
special statutory regulations (particularly the Public Transport Council 
Act implementation of which involves services which may not be 
profitable but yet important to certain sectors of the society).
The Singapore competition law excludes certain agreements 
from the ambit of the law provided that it fulfills certain criteria. First, 
the agreements must have net economic benefit such as improving 
production or distribution, or promoting technical or economic 
progress. Second, the restrictions are absolutely necessary to achieving 
these benefits, and third the agreements do not substantially eliminate 
competition.
Unlike the Malaysian competition law, the Singapore 
competition law does not include social benefits a ground to exempt 
an agreement. The question is whether the non-economic goals 
have legitimate place in the Singapore exemption regime. Attempt 
to include social considerations can be illustrated in the case of the 
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Singapore Medical Association.52 This case relates to the notification 
by the Singapore Medical Association [hereinafter SMA]Guidelines on 
Fees for Doctors in Private Practice in Singapore [hereinafter the GOF]
which recommends a range of fees (i.e. consultation fees, medicine 
fees, prescription fees, medical report fees, surgical fees, and doctor’s 
court appearance fees) for medical services and procedures.53 The 
social and public interest benefit was invoked in by the SMA to release 
the guidelines from the ambit of the Singapore competition law. It 
was claimed that since the degree of information asymmetries in the 
Singapore healthcare services is relative high, the GOF is important to 
protect the patient’s interest ‘by increasing transparency of healthcare 
costs, diminishing the information asymmetry between patients and 
medical practitioners, allowing patients to make an informed choice of 
medical practitioner, so that over-charging can be identified and curbed 
in the private sector’.54 It was also submitted that the increase in price of 
private medical services may result in the consumption of the medical 
service falling below socially and economically optimal levels.55 
However, the Singapore Competition Commission decided that the 
GOF did not meet the requirements of either improving production or 
distribution, or promoting technical or economic progress, of medical 
services in Singapore to in order to qualify for an exclusion from the 
application of Section 34 of CA 2004.56
52 Competition Commission of Singapore, Decision against the 
Singapore Medical Association in relation to its Guideline on Fees 
Pursuant to Section 44 of the Competition Act (Issued Decision, 
18 August 2010), http://www.ccs.gov.sg/content/dam/ccs/PDFs/ 
Public_register_and_consultation/Public_register/Anticompetitive_
Agreements/SMA-SD%20%2818%20Aug%202010%29.pdf24 (last 
visited July 3, 2013).
53 Competition Commission of Singapore, Singapore Medical 
Association’s Notification on Guidelines on Fees (Notifying Date, 
5 February 2009), http://www.ccs.gov.sg/content/ccs/en/Public-
Register-and-Consultation/Public-Register/Anti-competitive-
Agreements.detail.singapore_medicalassociationguidelinesonfees.
html (last visited July 3, 2013).
54 Supra note 55.
55 Id.
56 Section 34 of the Competition Act 2004 (Singapore) prohibits 
vertical or horizontal agreements which have the object or effect of 
preventing, distorting or restricting competition in Singapore.  
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It is interesting to note here that social or public interest 
consideration may have legitimate place in enforcing the Singapore 
competition law. However, the social benefits may be taken into 
consideration if it can be translated into economic efficiency gains 
(such as improving production or distribution, or promoting technical 
or economic progress) and has pro-competitive effects such as curing 
market failure and resolving the issue of information asymmetries.
Indonesia
As regards Indonesia, the Law No. 5 of 1999 provides social 
exemptions in the provisions on general exemptions (Articles 
50 and 51). The general exemptions highlight the influence on 
Indonesian competition law by diverse policy considerations such as 
protection of intellectual property rights, international trade and more 
importantly those considerations include protection of SMEs and also 
the consideration of national interest in the activities carried out by 
State-owned enterprises.57
On this basis, Article 50 excludes certain conduct or agreements 
from being regulated by Law No 5 of 199958 but social considerations 
are likely to entail from agreements to implement applicable laws and 
regulations, agreements to promote and improve people’s standard of 
life, activities of small-scale enterprises and activities of a cooperative 
serving its members.
In relation to agreements or conduct to implement applicable 
laws and regulations, an enterprise that is implementing a particular 
 
57 A.F. Lubiset. al., Hukum Persaingan Usaha: Antara Teks dan Konteks, 
(Indonesia: Deutsche Gesellschaftfür Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ) GmbH, 2009), 219, online version http://www.kppu.go.id/
docs/buku/buku_ajar.pdf (last visited Nov 22, 2013).
58 They are those regarding intellectual property rights, agreements 
related to franchise, agreements to implement applicable laws and 
regulations, agreement to set up certain technical standard, agreement 
on agency, agreement on research and development, agreement to 
promote and improve people’s standard of life, ratified international 
agreement, export agreements, activities of small-scale enterprises 
and activities of a cooperative serving its members.
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order pursuant to a legislative requirement must be “instructed” 
or such power or authority is delegated by a law or regulation, 
or the enterprise itself was constituted or instructed by the State. 
This kind of exemption is needed to balance the inequitable 
economic strength of big corporations and SMEs such that the 
latter can be empowered to move up to the level playing field, 
as well as to ensure access to public goods which can only be 
effectively facilitated by the State will not be disrupted by 
economic considerations of private players. An example of such 
laws and regulations that are concerned with social exemptions 
is Law No 19 of 2003 on Nation Social Security System and Law 
No 19 of 2003 on State-Owned Enterprises which may indulge in 
anti-competitive conduct or agreement in the course of providing 
essential services to the wider public.
As said, agreements and conduct to promote and improve 
people’s standards of life are also exempted under Law No 5 of 
1999. The context of this exemption needs to be understood in order 
to establish its parameters.  This type of agreements and conduct is 
common in an industry with a high level of collective participation, 
be it through combined efforts of business organisations or through 
decisions of trade associations. However the relevant venture is capital 
intensive but the fruits of the venture must be made available to the 
wider public. This of course refers to essential facilities such as the rail 
networks for the rail industry and distribution as well as transmission 
networks for the energy industry.
Finally, the social exemptions also cover agreements and 
conduct of the SMEs and cooperatives. Promotion of the interests 
and empowerment of SMEs as part of the wider notion of economic 
democracy has legislative mandate, in particular, following the 
success of the reformation movement in 1998. However, the main 
setbacks to the exclusion of SMEs from competition in Indonesia 
will be the lack of certainty in establishing the criteria for SMEs who 
can benefit from the exemptions and the difficulty of determining 
the limitations to the enjoyment of such benefits. The limitations are 
crucial for any discussion on possible “graduation” requirements that 
will cease the exemption given to an SME after certain circumstances 
have occured. As regards activities of cooperatives, their competition 
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exemption very much depends on legislative authorisations59 but the 
rationales of exemption have some similarities with exemption and 
protection given to SMEs in terms of empowering and enhancing the 
capacity and resilience of such small players in competing against 
big players in the economy. The activities must come from and create 
outputs for the members of cooperatives while the exemptions will 
come hand in hand with direction from the Government to restrict 
entry into certain industries except for cooperatives with special 
consideration given to national economic interest, equal opportunities 
to do business and to work.60
Article 51 of the same law extends the exclusions/exemptions 
to monopoly or concentration of activities related to the production or 
marketing of goods or services affecting the livelihood of society at 
large and branches of production of a strategic nature for the state but it 
shall be stipulated in a law and shall be implemented by State-Owned 
Enterprises or institutions formed or appointed by the Government. The 
phrase livelihood of society at large refers to an activity that allocates 
goods or services derived from the State’s natural resources to be used 
for the maximum enhancement of people’s well-being (allocative), that 
distributes essential goods or services that are by nature difficult to be 
supplied by the market alone (distributive) and that stabilises the supply 
of goods or services that can be dispensed on the ground of public 
interest (stabilising).61 The second phrase that is production of strategic 
nature of the State refers to productive activities in the strategic fields 
that protect national defence and maintains law and order as well as those 
in the financial purview that ensures monetary stability and financial 
security and other public interest needs. However as mentioned above, 
in order to be exempted, the activities must be governed by legislation 
and implemented by or via the Government. If this is fulfilled, the 
exemption will allow monopoly and concentration activities to pursue 
social goals without any intervention from competition regulation.
In short, the Indonesian law exempts activities that enhance 
economic efficiency and protect intellectual property as well as 
activities that have social and public interest dimensions such as small 
59 See Law No 70 of 1958 on Cooperatives which first prescribed the 
regulations for cooperatives, and the much recent Law No 25 of 1992 
on Cooperatives.
60 Lubis, supra note 58, at 293.
61 Id., 306-308.
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scale activities and activities of cooperatives. The exemption regime 
will be enforced, keeping in view the Indonesian competition law 
objectives. Promoting competition and economic efficiency is not the 
only goals of the Indonesian competition law. The competition goal will 
have to be balanced against other broader objectives such as improving 
people’s quality of life. A great deal of uncertainties and unnecessary 
subjectivities will develop from this system making it likely for the law 
to be used to protect inefficient competitors rather than competition 
itself.
Thailand
The applicability of the main Thai competition legislation i.e. TCA 
1999 is subject to the exemptions enumerated in Section 4 of the Act. 
The provision states that the TCA 1999 shall not apply to the act of:
1. Central, provincial or local administration
2. State enterprises under the law of budgetary procedure
3. Farmers and cooperatives representing them
4. Businesses prescribed by Ministerial regulation which provides 
for exemption from the law.
Again social considerations may be pursued by the Thai competition 
authority when exempting the acts of government, public funded State 
enterprises and regulation-backed businesses from being subject to the 
prohibitions found in the TCA. But social character is more evident 
in the exemption given to farmers’ activities. The question now is 
whether such exemptions are available to large scale farmers which 
play a very big role in the Thai economy. The Thai competition law 
limits the exemption in agriculture only to the extent of farmer’s groups 
or cooperatives, which means the exemption will be limited to small-
holding farmers. This allows them to be shielded from free market 
competition. This exemption however has not come about without any 
criticisms. Large-scale farmers had complained that the exemption 
regime is unfair as exemption is given to State-owned enterprises.62
62 S. Thanitcul, “Competition Law in Thailand: A Preliminary 
Analysis”, Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev, 1(2002): 175.
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Social Considerations in Merger Decisions
Not all AMSs have provisions on merger control in their competition 
legislation. Singapore and Indonesian competition laws have such 
provisions while Malaysian competition law does not. In examining the 
possibility of including social considerations in merger decisions, this 
paper looks into the consideration of social factors such as employment 
by the relevant competition regulatory bodies when deciding on anti-
competitive mergers or to clear proposed mergers or acquisitions 
notified to them.
In Singapore there is no explicit mention of social factors 
as the required elements that have to be considered by the CCS in 
making a merger decision. However the CCS Guidelines on Merger 
Procedures 2012 allows merger parties to apply for exemption on 
public interest considerations if the CCS makes an unfavourable 
decision. The issue now is whether public interest considerations 
include social considerations like the consideration of the effect of 
a merger or acquisition on employment. Public interest is defined in 
Section 2 of CA 2004 as “national or public security, defence and such 
other considerations as the Minister may, by order published in the 
Gazette, prescribe.”63 As of now, there is yet any gazetted definition of 
public interest considerations other than national or public security and 
defence, limiting such considerations to those explicitly mentioned in 
the CCS Guidelines. 
In Indonesia, the Merger Control Regulations provide that 
the evaluation of anti-competitive mergers or acquisitions shall 
involve the analysis of the following factors: market concentration, 
entry barriers, possible anti-competitive behaviour, efficiency and/or 
bankruptcy. The assessment of the impact of a proposed merger on 
bankruptcy may require the consideration of the positive or negative 
effects of such merger on employment, for example the merger may 
be necessary to prevent the closing down of a business or the merger 
itself may contribute to such closure hence it must not be approved 
on the ground of preventing job losses. Therefore the inclusion of 
bankruptcy as a factor can facilitate the consideration of the social 
costs and benefits of the merger. At the same time the Regulations 
63 Competition Commission of Singapore, CCS Guidelines on Merger 
Procedures 2012 (2012), Guideline 7.2.
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allow the Commission to analyse other factors but such analysis must 
be pursuant to a regulation of the Commission. These other factors may 
also include social factors but whether this is the case depends on the 
issuance of an order or regulation by the Commission.
COMMON DENOMINATORS
It is acknowledged that different countries adopt different competition 
law systems to suit their local conditions and needs. However, it is 
recommended that the fundamental objective of a competition law 
should be to protect the process of competition expressed in the form 
of economic efficiency gains thus, promoting the overall economic 
growth and development.64 Economic analysis should play a central 
role in the application of competition law. This is because economic 
analysis imparts a greater precision and predictability and thus, limits 
the discretion of the decision-makers and increases transparency. 
Increasing reliance on the economic analysis helps to harmonise 
different competition system in ASEAN. It is argued that:
It is widely acknowledged that the application of 
economic analysis imparts a greater degree of precision 
and predictability in the enforcement of competition 
policy. Economic tools can be used effectively to 
analyse non-economic concerns, such as the fairness 
or equity implications of enforcement decisions, or to 
systematically assess the effects of different business 
practices and market structures.65
Social objectives are best pursued through other stand-alone 
policies or legislation. Social considerations should be separately examined 
from economic analysis to avoid confusion and inconsistency of outcome 
to promote competition and the economic objectives. However, invariably 
social goals can be taken into consideration if they can be translated into 
economic efficiency gains or if they are found to produce pro-competitive 
64 ASEAN, Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy, Para. 2.2.1 
(2010).
65 OECD and The World Bank, supra note 15, 5.
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effect (i.e. where they cure market failures by enhancing information, 
by rectifying imbalances of power or by internalising externalities). For 
example, in the EU, non-economic goals of competition law can be 
pursued if they are translated into efficiency and technological benefits as 
contained in Art 101(3) of TFEU.
A country may also exclude or exempt a list of specific activities 
or agreements based on public interest or social objectives. This may 
include activities that are based on the principle of solidarity, service 
of general economic interest, collective bargaining, etc. However, this 
must follow the principle of proportionality to prevent any abuse of 
discretionary power in excluding certain activities.‘Proportionality’ 
means any conduct that restricts competition should not go beyond 
what is necessary to ensure the effective fulfilment of the objectives. 
The EC principle of proportionality requires that measures adopted by 
community institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate 
and necessary to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by 
the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several 
appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, 
and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the 
aims pursued.66 The adoption of a block exemption regime is highly 
recommended. It provides a more transparent way to release certain 
activities from the ambit of competition law. Block exemption provides 
an opportunity for discussion before any agreement or activities are 
excluded for a certain period of time.
At the ASEAN level, it is possible to lay down identifiable 
social policy or social goals that should be allowed to be pursued 
through competition law. Though it may not be binding on Member 
States, it can serve as guidance on how to accommodate social goals 
through competition law enforcement, thus providing more certainty 
and transparency. Member States should be obliged to provide reason 
for any decision allowing social goals to be taken into consideration in 
their competition law enforcement.
66 Case C-331/88, The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food and Secretary of State for Health, ex parte: Fedesa and Others 
[1990] ECR I-04023, para 13. See also European Commission, 
Communications from the Commission -- Service of General Interest 
in Europe (2001) OJ C 17/4, Para 23.
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Figure 1: Proposed Model on the Social Boundaries of Competition Law
There are certain social policy goals that must be championed 
as they are necessary for deprived communities or groups. The 
attainment of these policy goals may collide with economic efficiency 
goals and the interests of some persistently deprived individuals can be 
aggregated so that “the law” may take into account the specific needs 
of rural communities, disabled people, poor farmers and fishermen, 
and indigenous people. However, such law is more appropriate to be 
represented by the regulatory framework promoting socio-economic 
development, not the law regulating competition in the market. 
Moreover, the application of such socio-economic regulatory framework 
must be an exception to the general rule. Too broad an interpretation of 
“persistent deprivation” will compromise the centrality of protecting 
the competitive process in competition law.
The Figure 1 illustrates the model that informs the discussions 
on possible common social denominators within competition regulation 
in ASEAN.
CONCLUSION
Competition law has a multiplicity of goals, both economic and 
non-economic, and the interplays between these different goals may 
generate diverse competition rules between AMSs which are evident 
in ASEAN. There are different approaches taken by different AMSs 
to regulating competition especially Indonesia which practices 
multiple objectives of competition law while Singapore and Malaysia 
focuses on protection of the process of competition. The practice by 
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Indonesia gives room for social considerations to be included within 
its competition regulatory framework. However, this may not be the 
case in other AMSs. Therefore there is a need to look into a common 
approach to the law in ASEAN. This paper finds that economic 
efficiency must still take priority over other goals, including social 
goals. Flexibility however should be given to AMSs to create “safety 
valves” for the stakeholders based on legitimate social grounds 
depending on the prevalent political, legal, economic and social 
environment in the respective AMS. Certain margins of appreciation 
must be accorded to the competition authorities of the AMSs in making 
“social interventions” in competition decision making. However the 
AMSs must utilise the flexibility in good faith so that inconsistencies 
in practice can be reduced. Should the inconsistencies be too hard to 
be avoided they may be moderated through a coordination mechanism 
that can be established at the ASEAN level. 
